


Logical Foundations of Intermittent Computing

Myra Dotzel

PhD Thesis Defense


What is intermittent computing?

- tiny devices that compute in inaccessible environments




What is intermittent computing?

- tiny devices that compute in inaccessible environments
- cannot rely on continuous energy sources




What is intermittent computing?

- tiny devices that compute in inaccessible environments
- cannot rely on continuous energy sources
- devices charge, compute, and crash



What is intermittent computing?

- tiny devices that compute in inaccessible environments
- cannot rely on continuous energy sources
- devices charge, compute, and crash
- **NV** survives power failures, **V** does not
- runtime system support needed to save state



How state is saved depends on execution mode

How state is saved depends on execution mode



```
let x = 5 in  
    c := x + 1;  
    h := c
```

JIT region

- **resume** execution
- save volatile state right **before power failure**


How state is saved depends on execution mode



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```

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How state is saved depends on execution mode



```
let x = 5 in  
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```

JIT region

- **resume** execution
- save volatile state right **before power failure**



```
start_atom  
  x := y;  
  y := z;  
  w := x + y  
end_atom
```

Atomic region


- **re-execute** from the beginning
- make copies of nonvolatile state **before (re-)execution**
- different **logging styles**

How state is saved depends on execution mode

 `let x = 5 in
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JIT region


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 `start_atom
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Atomic region

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
How state is saved depends on execution mode



```
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```


JIT region

- **resume** execution
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





```
start_atom  
    x := y;  
    y := z;  
    w := x + y  
end_atom
```


Atomic region

- **re-execute** from the beginning
- make copies of nonvolatile state **before (re-)execution**
- different **logging styles**



How state is saved depends on execution mode



```
let x = 5 in  
  c := x + 1;  
  h := c
```

- **resume** execution
- save volatile state right **before power failure**



Question:
Can programs execute correctly despite these power failures?



```
state  
  y := z;  
  w := x + y  
end_atom
```

- make copies of nonvolatile state **before (re-)execution**
- different **logging styles**



Atomic region

How state is saved depends on execution mode

 `let x = 5 in
 c := x + 1;
 h := c`

- **resume** execution
- save volatile state right **before power failure**




Answer:

It depends on *what* we save, or **checkpoint**

 `st
 y := z;
 w := x + y
end_atom`

- make copies of nonvolatile state **before (re-)execution**
- different **logging styles**



Atomic region

Which variables need to be checkpointed?

```
start_atom(?)  
  x := y;  
  y := z;  
  w := x + y  
end_atom
```

Checkpoint nothing

```
1 start_atom(_)  
2   x := y;  
3   y := z;  
4   w := x + y  
5 end_atom
```



NV	x	y	z	w
1	0	1	2	0
2	1	1	2	0
3	1	2	2	0

Checkpoint nothing

```
1 start_atom(_)  
2   x := y;  
3   y := z;  
4   w := x + y  
5 end_atom
```



NV	x	y	z	w
1	0	1	2	0
2	1	1	2	0
3	1	2	2	0
Restore	1	2	2	0

Checkpoint nothing

```
1 start_atom(_)  
2   x := y;  
3   y := z;  
4   w := x + y  
5 end_atom
```

reads value of y
from failed exec.!



		x	y	z	w
NV	1	0	1	2	0
	2	1	1	2	0
	3	1	2	2	0
	Restore	1	2	2	0
	2	2	2	2	0

Checkpoint nothing

```
1 start_atom(_)  
2   x := y;  
3   y := z;  
4   w := x + y  
5 end_atom
```



	NV	x	y	z	w
	1	0	1	2	0
	2	1	1	2	0
	3	1	2	2	0
Restore		1	2	2	0
	2	2	2	2	0
	3	2	2	2	0

Checkpoint nothing

```
1 start_atom(_)  
2   x := y;  
3   y := z;  
4   w := x + y  
5 end_atom
```




	NV	x	y	z	w
	1	0	1	2	0
	2	1	1	2	0
	3	1	2	2	0
Restore		1	2	2	0
	2	2	2	2	0
	3	2	2	2	0
	4	2	2	2	4

Checkpoint nothing

```
1 start_atom(_)  
2   x := y;  
3   y := z;  
4   w := x + y  
5 end_atom
```



NV		x	y	z	w
1		0	1	2	0
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3		1	2	2	0
Restore		1	2	2	0
2		2	2	2	0
3		2	2	2	0
4		2	2	2	4



NV		x	y	z	w
1		0	1	2	0
2		1	1	2	0
3		1	2	2	0
4		1	2	2	3

nothing
→ consistency bugs!


inconsistent memory!

Checkpoint nothing

```
1 start_atom(_)  
2   x := y;  
3   y := z;  
4   w := x + y  
5 end_atom
```



	x	y	z	w
NV				
1	0	1	2	0
2	1	1	2	0
3	1	2	2	0
Restore	1	2	2	0
2	2	2	2	0
3	2	2	2	0
4	2	2	2	4



	x	y	z	w
NV				
1	0	1	2	0
2	1	1	2	0
3	1	2	2	0
4	1	2	2	3

nothing
→ consistency bugs!

inconsistent memory!

“Nonvolatile memory is a broken time machine.”
- Benjamin Ransford and Brandon Lucia, 2014

Checkpoint everything! (undo logging)

```
1 start_atom(x,y,z,w)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```

NV 

x	y	z	w
0	1	2	0


NV 

	x	y	z	w
1	0	1	2	0
2	1	1	2	0
3	1	2	2	0
4	1	2	2	3

nothing
↪ consistency bugs!
everything

Checkpoint everything! (undo logging)


```
1 start_atom(x,y,z,w)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```



nothing
→ consistency bugs!
everything

Checkpoint everything! (undo logging)


```
1 start_atom(x,y,z,w)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```



nothing
↪ consistency bugs!
everything

Checkpoint everything! (undo logging)

```
1 start_atom(x,y,z,w)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```



nothing
→ consistency bugs!

everything
→ inefficient!

Do we really need to checkpoint everything?

```
1 start_atom(x,y,z,w)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```

Do we really need to checkpoint everything?


```
1 start_atom(x,y,z,w)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```

- z is never updated

Do we really need to checkpoint everything?

written
before read

```
1 start_atom(x,y,z,w)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```



- z is never updated
- x,w are written before being read

Do we really need to checkpoint everything?

```
1 start_atom(x,y,z,w)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```

- z is never updated
- x,w are written before being read

but what about y?

Do we really need to checkpoint everything?

```
1 start_atom(x,y,z,w)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```

- z is never updated
- x,w are written before being read

y is a “write-after-read (WAR) variable”

“No, only the WAR variables”

- Brandon Lucia and Benjamin Ransford, 2015

Checkpoint WAR variables (undo logging)

```
1 start_atom(y)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```

NV 

x	y	z	w
0	1	2	0

 NV

	x	y	z	w
1	0	1	2	0
2	1	1	2	0
3	1	2	2	0
4	1	2	2	3


nothing
→ consistency bugs!

everything
→ inefficient!

write-after-read
variables

Checkpoint WAR variables (undo logging)

```
1 start_atom(y)
2   x := y;
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4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```




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write-after-read
variables

Checkpoint WAR variables (undo logging)

```
1 start_atom(y)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```



The diagram illustrates the state of memory after a power outage. It shows a table of variables x, y, z, w across four rows. The initial state (row 1) has values 0, 1, 2, 0. A power outage occurs, and the state changes to row 4, where x=1, y=2, z=2, w=3. This state is inconsistent with the initial state.

	x	y	z	w
1	0	1	2	0
2	1	1	2	0
3	1	2	2	0
4	1	2	2	3


nothing
→ consistency bugs!

everything
→ inefficient!

write-after-read
variables

Checkpoint WAR variables (undo logging)


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```




- nothing
 - consistency bugs!
- everything
 - inefficient!
- write-after-read variables
 - ✓ state-of-the-art systems

Checkpoint WAR variables (undo vs redo logging)

```
1 start_atom(y)
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```





undo logging



redo logging


Checkpoint WAR variables (undo vs redo logging)

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


Checkpoint WAR variables (undo vs redo logging)

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2   x := y;
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
undo logging




redo logging

Checkpoint WAR variables (undo vs redo logging)

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
undo logging




redo logging

Checkpoint WAR variables (undo vs redo logging)

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```





undo logging



redo logging



Checkpoint WAR variables (undo vs redo logging)

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2   x := y;
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

Checkpoint WAR variables (undo vs redo logging)

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2   x := y;
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5 end_atom
```




Checkpoint WAR variables (undo vs redo logging)

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


Checkpoint WAR variables (undo vs redo logging)

```
1 start_atom(y)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```



undo logging



redo logging

“Undo and redo logging are equivalent!”
- Surbatovich et al., 2020

Checkpoint WAR variables (undo vs redo logging)

```
1 start_atom(y)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y;
5 end_atom
```



Question:
How can we **prove** that programs execute correctly intermittently?


undo logging

redo logging

“Undo and redo logging are equivalent!”


- Surbatovich et al., 2020

Ensuring the *correctness* of intermittent systems




- first formal framework for reasoning about intermittent execution [Surbatovich et al. '20]

Ensuring the *correctness* of intermittent systems



- first formal framework for reasoning about intermittent execution [Surbatovich et al. '20]
- information flow type system w/ correctness as noninterference [Surbatovich et al. '23]

Non-idempotent data (Nid) should not flow to idempotent variables (Id)!



Ensuring the *correctness* of intermittent systems

What's missing?

- logical framework for reasoning about **crashes in general**
- flexible supports for more complex behaviors, e.g., **outputs, concurrency, etc.**

- first form
- information flow type system w/ correctness as noninterference [Surbatovich et al. '23]

Non-idempotent data (Nid) should not flow to idempotent variables (Id)!



Thesis statement

“Type-based abstractions rooted in logic provide a uniform way to statically reason about the correctness of intermittent computation that scales to more realistic scenarios.”

- Me, today

Agenda

- Chapters 3 and 4: Modal crash types for intermittent computing
[Derakhshan et al., ESOP '23][**Dotzel et al., TOPLAS '25**]
- Chapter 5: Crash types with undo-logging
- Chapter 6: Crash types with I/O, nonidempotence, and flexible branching
- Chapter 7: Formal Foundations of Intermittent Concurrency

Modal Crash Types


[Derakhshan et al., ESOP '23][Dotzel et al., TOPLAS '25]

**“First logical interpretation of intermittent computing”
power failure, restore, commit.**

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power failure, restore, commit.

One approach: checkpoint
everything not read-only
[Derakhshan et al. '23]




```
start_atom(x,y,w)
  x := y;
  y := z;
  w := x + y
end_atom
```

redo logging
 $\mathcal{L}$ combined in V


“First logical interpretation of intermittent computing”

power failure, restore, commit.

One approach: checkpoint everything not read-only [Derakhshan et al. '23]



More efficient: checkpoint only write-after-read variables [Dotzel et al. '25]



```
start atom(y)
  x := y;
  y := z;
  w := x + y;
end_atom
```

redo logging
 $\mathcal{L}$ combined in V

Types allow us to automatically check that programs will execute **correctly intermittently**.

Basic types and access qualifiers

basic types

$T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$

access qualifiers

$qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{RD} \mid \text{MtWt} \mid \text{Wtn}$

unstable types

$\tau^u := T \mid \downarrow \tau^s \mid \tau^u \vee \tau^u \mid \nu_t$

stable types

$\tau^s := \uparrow \tau^u \mid \boxed{\text{||||}} \rightsquigarrow \tau^s$

```
start_atom(y)
  x := y;
  y := z;
  w := x + y
end_atom
```

CK – checkpointed

RD – read only

MtWt – must-first-write

Wtn – written

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CK – checkpointed

RD – read only

MtWt – must-first-write

Wtn – written

- y is checkpointed

$y : \text{CK}$

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start_atom(y)
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```

CK – checkpointed

RD – read only

MtWt – must-first-write

Wtn – written

- y is checkpointed
- z is never updated

$y : \text{CK}$
 $z : \text{RD}$

Basic types and access qualifiers

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CK – checkpointed

RD – read only

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
Wtn – written

- y is checkpointed $y : \text{CK}$
- z is never updated $z : \text{RD}$
- x, w are written before being read $x, w : \text{MtWt}$

Stable and unstable types

basic types $T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$
access qualifiers $qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{RD} \mid \text{MtWt} \mid \text{Wtn}$
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τ^u **in-progress execution** /
values in **volatile memory** (e.g., logs)




τ^s **successful execution** /
values in **nonvolatile memory**

Adjoint Logic*

basic types $T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$
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Independence principle: validity does not depend on truth.



* [Pruiksma et al. '21, Pfenning et al. '01, Benton et al. '97]

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```
start_atom(y)
  x := y;
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end_atom
```

✓ τ^s

Independence principle: validity does not depend on truth.

“Zena the cat *always* steals my hair tie”

“Zena the cat stole my hair tie *today*”



* [Pruiksma et al. '21, Pfenning et al. '01, Benton et al. '97]

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


τ^u

τ^s

Independence principle: **validity** does not depend on **truth**.

“Zena the cat *always* steals my hair tie”




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
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


Here: a stable (s) computation must not depend on unstable (u) values.

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
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Independence principle: **validity** does not depend on **truth**.


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Here: a **stable (s)** computation must not depend on **unstable (u)** values.



* [Pruiksma et al. '21, Pfenning et al. '01, Benton et al. '97]

Crash Type

basic types

$T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$

access qualifiers



$qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{RD} \mid \text{MtWt} \mid \text{Wtn}$

unstable types

$\tau^u := T \mid \downarrow \tau^s \mid \tau^u \vee \tau^u \mid \nu_t$



stable types

$\tau^s := \uparrow \tau^u \mid \boxed{\text{||||}} \rightsquigarrow \tau^s$



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basic types	$T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$
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Crash Type

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

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
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Crash Type

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unstable types	$\tau^u := T \mid \downarrow \tau^s \mid \tau^u \vee \tau^u \mid \nu_t$
stable types	$\tau^s := \uparrow \tau^u \mid \text{[icon]} \rightsquigarrow \tau^s$



$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee \downarrow \overline{\hspace{1.5cm}}$$

Successful execution

Failed execution

PwOff

Crash Type

basic types

$T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$

access qualifiers


$qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{RD} \mid \text{MtWt} \mid \text{Wtn}$

unstable types

$\tau^u := T \mid \downarrow \tau^s \mid \tau^u \vee \tau^u \mid \nu_t$

stable types

$\tau^s := \uparrow \tau^u \mid \text{Charge} \leadsto \tau^s$




$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee \downarrow (\text{Charge} \leadsto __)$$

Successful execution

Failed execution

Crash Type

basic types	$T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$
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$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee \downarrow (\boxed{\text{||||}} \rightsquigarrow \uparrow \text{Restore})$$

Successful execution

Failed execution

Crash Type

basic types

$T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$

access qualifiers


$qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{RD} \mid \text{MtWt} \mid \text{Wtn}$

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stable types

$\tau^s := \uparrow \tau^u \mid \boxed{\text{||||}} \rightsquigarrow \tau^s$



$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee \downarrow (\boxed{\text{||||}} \rightsquigarrow \uparrow C)$$

Successful execution

Failed execution

Re-execute

Typing judgments

basic types $T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$
 access qualifiers $qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{RD} \mid \text{MtWt} \mid \text{Wtn}$
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 stable types $\tau^s := \uparrow \tau^u \mid \boxed{\text{---}} \rightsquigarrow \tau^s$

start_atom(y)
 x := y;
 y := z;
 w := x + y;
 end_atom

τ^u

τ^s

Unstable typing judgment


_____ $\vdash$ _____

Stable typing judgment

_____ $\vdash$ _____

Typing judgments

basic types $T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$
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Unstable typing judgment


$\frac{}{\vdash x := y : C}$
 Command is well-typed

Stable typing judgment


$\frac{}{\vdash}$

Typing judgments


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Unstable typing judgment



Stable typing judgment



Typing judgments

basic types $T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$


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```

start_atom(y)
  x := y;
  y := z;
  w := x + y;
end_atom
        
```







Unstable typing judgment



$x : \tau^s \quad y : \tau^u$

|

$\Omega \mid \Sigma$

⊢

$x := y : \mathbf{C} \dashv \Omega'$

Energy
buffer

stable/
unstable
typing
contexts

Command is
well-typed

Post-
context

Stable typing judgment

⊢


Typing judgments

basic types $T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$


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
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Unstable typing judgment



Stable typing judgment



Typing a program bottom-up



$x, y, z, w : CK$

$\vdash$

```
start_atom(y)
  x := y;
  y := z;
  w := x + y
end_atom
```

$: \uparrow C$

Typing a program bottom-up



$y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK}$

$\vdash x := y; y := z; w := x + y : \text{C} \dashv _$



$x, y, z, w : \text{CK} \vdash$

```
start_atom(y)
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```

$: \uparrow \text{C}$

Typing a program bottom-up

 | $y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD}$ | $y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash x := y : \text{C} \dashv _$

 | $_$ | $y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash y := z : \tau^u \dashv _$

 | $_$ | $y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash w := x + y : \tau^u \dashv _$

 | $y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD}$ | $y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK}$

$\vdash x := y; y := z; w := x + y : \text{C} \dashv _$

 | $x, y, z, w : \text{CK} \vdash$
 $\text{start_atom}(y)$
 $x := y;$
 $y := z;$
 $w := x + y$
 end_atom
 $: \uparrow \text{C}$

Typing a program bottom-up

 | $y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD}$ | $y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash x := y : \text{C} \dashv \dots, x : \text{Wtn}, \dots$

 | _____ | $y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash y := z : \tau^u \dashv \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$

 | _____ | $y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash w := x + y : \tau^u \dashv \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$

 | $y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD}$ | $y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK}$

$\vdash x := y; y := z; w := x + y : \text{C} \dashv \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$

 | $x, y, z, w : \text{CK} \vdash$
 $\text{start_atom}(y)$
 $x := y;$
 $y := z;$
 $w := x + y$
 end_atom
 $: \uparrow \text{C}$

Typing a program bottom-up

 $\mid y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash x := y : \text{C} \dashv \dots, x : \text{Wtn}, \dots$

 $\mid y : \text{CK}, x : \text{Wtn}, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash y := z : \tau^u \dashv \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$

 $\mid \underline{\hspace{10cm}} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash w := x + y : \tau^u \dashv \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$

 $\mid y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK}$

$\vdash x := y; y := z; w := x + y : \text{C} \dashv \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$

 $\mid x, y, z, w : \text{CK} \vdash$
 $\text{start_atom}(y)$
 $x := y;$
 $y := z;$
 $w := x + y$
 end_atom
 $: \uparrow \text{C}$

Typing a program bottom-up

 $| y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash x := y : \text{C} \dashv \dots, x : \text{Wtn}, \dots$

 $| y : \text{CK}, x : \text{Wtn}, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash y := z : \tau^u \dashv \dots, y : \text{CK}, \dots$

 $| \underline{\hspace{10em}} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash w := x + y : \tau^u \dashv \underline{\hspace{1em}}$

 $| y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK}$

$\vdash x := y; y := z; w := x + y : \text{C} \dashv \underline{\hspace{1em}}$

 $| x, y, z, w : \text{CK} \vdash$
 $\text{start_atom}(y)$
 $x := y;$
 $y := z;$
 $w := x + y$
 end_atom
 $: \uparrow \text{C}$

Typing a program bottom-up

 | $y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash x := y : \text{C} \dashv \dots, x : \text{Wtn}, \dots$

 | $y : \text{CK}, x : \text{Wtn}, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash y := z : \tau^u \dashv \dots, y : \text{CK}, \dots$

 | $y : \text{CK}, x : \text{Wtn}, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash w := x + y : \tau^u \dashv \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$

 | $y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK}$

$\vdash x := y; y := z; w := x + y : \text{C} \dashv \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$

 | $x, y, z, w : \text{CK} \vdash$
 $\text{start_atom}(y)$
 $x := y;$
 $y := z;$
 $w := x + y$
 end_atom
 $: \uparrow \text{C}$

Typing a program bottom-up

 $\mid y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash x := y : \text{C} \dashv \dots, x : \text{Wtn}, \dots$

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 $\mid y : \text{CK}, x : \text{Wtn}, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash w := x + y : \tau^u \dashv y : \text{CK}, x : \text{Wtn}, w : \text{Wtn}, z : \text{RD}$

 $\mid y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK}$

$\vdash x := y; y := z; w := x + y : \text{C} \dashv \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$

 $\mid x, y, z, w : \text{CK} \vdash$
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 $x := y;$
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 $: \uparrow \text{C}$

Typing a program bottom-up

 $\mid y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash x := y : \text{C} \dashv \dots, x : \text{Wtn}, \dots$

 $\mid y : \text{CK}, x : \text{Wtn}, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash y := z : \tau^u \dashv \dots, y : \text{CK}, \dots$

 $\mid y : \text{CK}, x : \text{Wtn}, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK} \vdash w := x + y : \tau^u \dashv y : \text{CK}, x : \text{Wtn}, w : \text{Wtn}, z : \text{RD}$

 $\mid y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{MtWt}, z : \text{RD} \mid y^{\text{ck}} : \text{CK}$

$\vdash x := y; y := z; w := x + y : \text{C} \dashv y : \text{CK}, x, w : \text{Wtn}, z : \text{RD}$



$x, y, z, w : \text{CK} \vdash$


```
start_atom(y)
  x := y;
  y := z;
  w := x + y
end_atom
```

$: \uparrow \text{C}$

no remaining MtWt!

Proving Correctness

Every intermittent execution of a **well-typed** program can be simulated by its continuous execution.



Term Relation

$$(\text{🔋} \text{ INV } | V | \underline{c_1}, \text{🔌} \text{ NV } | V | c_2) \in \underline{\mathcal{E}} [\mathbf{C}_{Unit}]^m$$

where c_1 is...

$x := y$ if v then c else c'

let $x = e$ in c $c; c'$

Value Relation

$$(\text{🔋} \text{ INV } | V | \underline{v_1}, \text{🔌} \text{ INV } | V | c_2) \in \underline{\mathcal{V}} [\mathbf{C}_{Unit}]^m$$

where v_1 is... n true false skip

$$\downarrow \text{☀️} (\uparrow c) \quad \text{☀️} (\uparrow c) \quad \uparrow c$$

Logical relation for atomic regions

$$(\text{🔋} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c, \text{🔌} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{E} \llbracket C_{Unit} \rrbracket^0$$

no remaining
attempts



Logical relation for atomic regions

$$\left(\begin{array}{|c|} \hline \text{[Green Bar]} \\ \hline \end{array} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c, \begin{array}{|c|} \hline \text{[Plug Icon]} \\ \hline \end{array} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c \right) \in \mathcal{E} \llbracket C_{Unit} \rrbracket^0$$

no remaining attempts

$$\left(\begin{array}{|c|} \hline \text{[Green Bar]} \\ \hline \end{array} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c, \begin{array}{|c|} \hline \text{[Plug Icon]} \\ \hline \end{array} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c \right) \in \mathcal{E} \llbracket C_{Unit} \rrbracket^{k+1}$$

at least one remaining attempt



If there *is* a power failure...

$$(\text{🔋} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c, \text{🔌} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{E}[\mathbb{C}_{Unit}]^{k+1}$$

Device powers off

$$(\text{[Battery Full]} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c, \text{[Plugged]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{E} \llbracket C_{Unit} \rrbracket^{k+1}$$

$$\text{iff } (\text{[Battery Low]} \mid NV'_1 \mid V' \mid \downarrow, \text{[Plugged]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{V} \llbracket \downarrow (\text{[Battery Full]} \rightsquigarrow \uparrow C_{Unit}) \rrbracket^k \quad \text{PwOff}$$

Energy buffer charges

$$(\text{[Battery Icon]} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c, \text{[Plug Icon]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{E} \llbracket C_{Unit} \rrbracket^{k+1}$$

$$\text{iff } (\text{[Lightning Bolt Icon]} \mid NV'_1 \mid V' \mid \downarrow \text{[Monitor Icon]} (\uparrow c_1), \text{[Plug Icon]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{V} \llbracket \downarrow (\text{[Battery Icon]} \rightsquigarrow \uparrow C_{Unit}) \rrbracket^k \quad \text{PwOff}$$

$$\text{iff } (\text{[Lightning Bolt Icon]} \mid NV'_1 \mid \text{[Monitor Icon]} (\uparrow c_1), \text{[Plug Icon]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{V} \llbracket \text{[Battery Icon]} \rightsquigarrow \uparrow C_{Unit} \rrbracket^k \quad \text{Charge (for all [Battery Icon])}$$

V is wiped

Execution state is restored

$$(\text{[Full Battery]} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c, \text{[Plugged]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{E} \llbracket C_{Unit} \rrbracket^{k+1}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \downarrow^* \quad \downarrow^0 \\ \text{iff } & (\text{[Red Lightning]} \mid NV'_1 \mid V' \mid \downarrow \text{[Monitor]}, (\uparrow c_1), \text{[Plugged]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{V} \llbracket \downarrow (\text{[Full Battery]} \rightsquigarrow \uparrow C_{Unit}) \rrbracket^k && \text{PwOff} \\ \text{iff } & (\text{[Red Lightning]} \mid NV'_1 \mid \text{[Monitor]} (\uparrow c_1), \text{[Plugged]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{V} \llbracket \text{[Full Battery]} \rightsquigarrow \uparrow C_{Unit} \rrbracket^k && \text{Charge} \\ \text{iff } & (\text{[Full Battery]} \mid NV'_1 \mid \uparrow c_1, \text{[Plugged]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{V} \llbracket \uparrow C_{Unit} \rrbracket^k && \text{Restore} \end{aligned}$$

Program re-executes

$$(\text{[Battery Icon]} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c, \text{[Plug Icon]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{E} \llbracket C_{Unit} \rrbracket^{k+1}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \downarrow^* \quad \downarrow^0 \\ \text{iff } & (\text{[Lightning Bolt Icon]} \mid NV'_1 \mid V' \mid \downarrow \text{[Monitor Icon]} (\uparrow c_1), \text{[Plug Icon]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{V} \llbracket \downarrow (\text{[Battery Icon]} \rightsquigarrow \uparrow C_{Unit}) \rrbracket^k && \text{PwOff} \\ \text{iff } & (\text{[Lightning Bolt Icon]} \mid NV'_1 \mid \text{[Monitor Icon]} (\uparrow c_1), \text{[Plug Icon]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{V} \llbracket \text{[Battery Icon]} \rightsquigarrow \uparrow C_{Unit} \rrbracket^k && \text{Charge} \\ \text{iff } & (\text{[Battery Icon]} \mid \underset{\text{Wtn}}{NV'_1} \mid \uparrow c_1, \text{[Plug Icon]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{V} \llbracket \uparrow C_{Unit} \rrbracket^k && \text{Restore} \\ \text{iff } & (\text{[Battery Icon]} \mid \underset{\text{MtWt}}{NV''_1} \mid V \mid c, \text{[Plug Icon]} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{E} \llbracket C_{Unit} \rrbracket^k && \text{Re-execution} \\ & \quad \quad \quad \text{logs restored} && (NV'_1 \setminus \text{MtWt} = NV_2 \setminus \text{MtWt}) \end{aligned}$$

If there is *no* power failure...

$$(\text{🔋} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c, \text{🔌} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{E} [\mathbf{C}_{Unit}]^{k+1}$$

Stable values are committed

$$(\text{🔋} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c , \text{🔌} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{E} [\mathbf{C}_{Unit}]^{k+1}$$

↓_{*n*}

↓_{*n*}

iff

$$(\text{🔋} \mid NV'_1 \mid V' \mid \text{skip} , \text{🔌} \mid NV'_2 \mid V' \mid \text{skip}) \in \mathcal{V} [\downarrow \uparrow unit]^k$$

Commit

We are done!

$$(\text{🔋} \mid NV_1 \mid V \mid c, \text{🔌} \mid NV_2 \mid V \mid c) \in \mathcal{E}[\mathbf{C}_{Unit}]^{k+1}$$

↓_n

↓_n

iff

$$(\text{🔋} \mid NV'_1 \mid V' \mid \text{skip}, \text{🔌} \mid NV'_2 \mid V' \mid \text{skip}) \in \mathcal{V}[\downarrow \uparrow unit]^k$$

Commit

iff


$$(\text{🔋} \mid NV''_1 \mid V' \mid \text{skip}, \text{🔌} \mid NV''_2 \mid V' \mid \text{skip}) \in \mathcal{V}[\uparrow unit]^k$$

Success!

($NV''_1 = NV''_2$)


all MtWt variables are written (Wtn)
to by last execution

Progress and Preservation




Well-typed commands don't get stuck and stay well-typed

Fundamental Theorem of Logical Relation



Well-typed code regions are self-related

Adequacy



Every intermittent execution of a well-typed program can be simulated by its continuous execution



In summary

- first logical interpretation of key operations of intermittent execution
- a novel logical relation to characterize correctness
- supports and reasoning for JIT and atomic regions (see thesis!)

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- tied specifically to redo-logging, which is not that common
- support for I/O? flexible branching?

In summary

- first logical interpretation of key operations of intermittent execution
- a novel
- support

Can we use crash types to reason about common system features, e.g., **undo logging**, **I/O**, **flexible branching**?

Limitations

- tied specifically to redo-logging, which is not that common
- support for I/O? flexible branching?

In summary

- first logical interpretation of key operations of intermittent execution
- a novel
- support

Yes we can!

Limitations

- tied specifically to redo-logging, which is not that common
- support for I/O? flexible branching?

Crash types for undo-logging


Undo-logging writes directly on NV

```
1 start_atom(_)  
2   x := y;  
3   y := z;  
4   w := x + y  
5 end_atom
```




Undo-logging writes directly on NV

```
1 start_atom(_)  
2   x := y;  
3   y := z;  
4   w := x + y  
5 end_atom
```




Undo-logging writes directly on NV

```
1 start_atom(____)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```




Undo-logging writes directly on NV

```
1 start_atom(____)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
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5 end_atom
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Undo-logging writes directly on NV


```
1 start_atom(_)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```



nonvolatile state is **unstable** through power failure and restore!

Undo-logging crash type

```
1 start_atom(____)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```



nonvolatile state is **unstable** through power failure and restore!


$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit } v$

Successful execution

Failed execution

Undo-logging crash type

```
1 start_atom(_)  
2   x := y;  
3   y := z;  
4   w := x + y  
5 end_atom
```




nonvolatile state is **unstable** through power failure and restore!

$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee \left(\text{Charge} \rightsquigarrow \text{Failed execution} \right)$$

Successful execution

Undo-logging crash type

```
1 start_atom(____)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```




nonvolatile state is **unstable** through power failure and restore!

$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee (\text{Ckpt} \rightsquigarrow \downarrow \uparrow C)$$

Successful execution Re-execute Failed execution

Undo-logging crash type

```
1 start_atom(____)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom
```



nonvolatile state is **unstable** through power failure and restore!

$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit } \vee \left(\text{restore NV} \left(\text{checkpoint icon} \right) \rightsquigarrow \downarrow \uparrow C \right)$$

undo-logging crash type

$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit } \vee \downarrow \left(\text{checkpoint icon} \right) \rightsquigarrow \uparrow C$$


redo-logging crash type

Undo-logging crash type

```

1 start_atom(_)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom

```



$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee (\text{[icon]} \rightsquigarrow \downarrow \uparrow C)$$


basic types $T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$
 access qualifiers $qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{RD} \mid \text{MtWt} \mid \text{Wtn}$
 unstable types $\tau^u := T \mid \downarrow \tau^s \mid \tau^u \vee \tau^u \mid C$
 $\mid \text{[icon]} \rightsquigarrow \tau^u$
 stable types $\tau^s := \uparrow \tau^u$

Undo-logging crash type

```

1 start_atom(_)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom


```



$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee (\text{NV} \rightsquigarrow \downarrow \uparrow C)$$

basic types $T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$
 access qualifiers $qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{RD} \mid \text{MtWt} \mid \text{Wtn}$
 unstable types $\tau^u := T \mid \downarrow \tau^s \mid \tau^u \vee \tau^u \mid C$
 $\mid \text{NV} \rightsquigarrow \tau^u$
 stable types $\tau^s := \uparrow \tau^u$

Σ types a portion of nonvolatile memory




Undo-logging crash type

```

1 start_atom(_)
2   x := y;
3   y := z;
4   w := x + y
5 end_atom

```



$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee (\text{NV} \leadsto \downarrow \uparrow C)$$

basic types

$$T := \text{int} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{unit}$$

access qualifiers

$$qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{RD} \mid \text{MtWt} \mid \text{Wtn}$$

unstable types


$$\tau^u := T \mid \downarrow \tau^s \mid \tau^u \vee \tau^u \mid C$$

$$\mid \text{NV} \leadsto \tau^u$$

stable types

$$\tau^s := \uparrow \tau^u$$

Σ types a portion of nonvolatile memory




undo-logging operations also have interpretations in adjoint logic! (see thesis)

Metatheory

- progress and preservation

- similar to redo-logging



- fundamental theorem and adequacy (future work!)


- need to define a new logical relation for undo-logging

$$(\boxed{\text{||||}} \mid \text{INV} \mid V \mid c_1, \text{🔌} \mid \text{NV} \mid V \mid c_2) \in \mathcal{V} \llbracket \downarrow \uparrow C_{unit} \rrbracket^m \quad \text{iff} \quad ???$$

In summary

- an interpretation of crash types for undo-logging atomic regions
- unstable values can live in nonvolatile memory


$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit } v \left(\boxed{\text{||||}} \rightsquigarrow \begin{array}{c} \text{restore NV} \\ \downarrow \uparrow \end{array} C \right)$$



Modal Crash Types w/ I/O, nonidempotence, flexible branching


Embedded applications rely on *non-deterministic* sensor inputs

input-dependent = tainted




Embedded applications rely on *non-deterministic* sensor inputs

input-dependent = tainted




Embedded applications rely on *non-deterministic* sensor inputs

input-dependent = tainted




Embedded applications rely on *non-deterministic* sensor inputs

input-dependent = tainted




Embedded applications rely on *non-deterministic* sensor inputs

input-dependent = tainted




Embedded applications rely on *non-deterministic* sensor inputs

input-dependent = tainted




Another class of memory consistency bug: repeated I/O (RIO)

input-dependent = tainted




“checkpoint variables written in one branch but not all (e.g., log and bin)”
- Surbatovich et al., 2020


Prior RIO checking is too strict



Prior RIO checking is too strict



Prior RIO checking is too strict



“log and bin must be checkpointed!”

Can we do better? i.e., develop a type checking that requires fewer checkpointed variables?



Another class of R/O bug

Repeated outputs cause duplicate effects

```
start_atom(-)  
  water_crop  
end_atom
```



water_crop




Another class of R/O bug

Repeated outputs cause duplicate effects

```
start_atom(-)  
  water_crop  
end_atom
```



pwoff





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Repeated outputs cause duplicate effects

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water_crop





Another class of R/O bug

Repeated outputs cause duplicate effects

```
start_atom(-)  
  water_crop  
end_atom
```




water_crop



Another class of R/O bug

Repeated outputs cause duplicate effects

```
start_atom(-)  
  water_crop  
end_atom
```




repeated outputs can cause irreversible and harmful effects!

Another class of RIO bug

Repeated outputs cause duplicate effects

```
start_atom(-)  
  water_crop  
end_atom
```



repeated outputs can cause irreversible and harmful effects!

no **provably correct** intermittent supports for outputs!

More flexible RIO supports


outputs

- idempotent or nonidempotent

e.g., **water_crop**





calibrate_wheel



0

- delay idempotent outputs until end of atomic region



**idempotent outputs are
not repeated**

More flexible RIO supports

```
start_atom(nlds: rb, ckpts: bin)
  rb++
  let temp = IN() in
    water_crop
    if temp > 40
```

log := temp/2

bin := temp


```
log := temp
log := (log - 32) * 5/9
end_atom
```

no remaining
mayTntWt
variables!

outputs

- idempotent or nonidempotent

e.g., **water_crop** **calibrate_wheel**



0

- delay idempotent outputs until end of atomic region

inputs

- fine-grained qualifiers to delay failing

e.g., **mayTntWt**

“written on one tainted
branch but not on all”

Qualifiers for inputs and (non-)idempotence

```
start_atom(nlds: rb, ckpts: bin)
  rb++
  let temp = IN() in
    water_crop
    if temp > 40
```

```
log := temp/2
```

```
bin := temp
```

```
log := temp
log := (log - 32) * 5/9
end_atom
```

$q := \langle qId, qIO \rangle$

idem. $qId := Id \mid Id(qAcc) \mid Nid$

taint $qIO := Tnt \mid Nt$

access $qAcc := CK \mid Wtn \mid NRD \mid mayFstRD$
 $\mid MTntWt \mid mayTntWt$

see paper for
join semi-lattices

Qualifiers for inputs and (non-)idempotence

```
start_atom(nlds: rb, ckpts: bin)
  rb++
  let temp = IN() in
    water_crop
  if temp > 40
```

log := temp/2

bin := temp

```
log := temp
log := (log - 32) * 5/9
end_atom
```

$q := \langle qId, qIO \rangle$

idem. $qId := Id \mid Id(qAcc) \mid Nid$

taint $qIO := Tnt \mid Nt$

access $qAcc := CK \mid Wtn \mid NRD \mid mayFstRD$
 $\mid MTntWt \mid mayTntWt$

see paper for
join semi-lattices

access qualifiers allow more flexible type checking

Qualifiers for inputs and (non-)idempotence

```

start_atom(nlds: rb, ckpts: bin)
  rb++
  let temp = IN() in
    water_crop
    if temp > 40


```

bin: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{CK}), \text{Nt} \rangle$, log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{NRD}), \text{Nt} \rangle$

```

       $q := \langle qId, qIO \rangle$ 
idem.   $qId := \text{Id} \mid \text{Id}(qAcc) \mid \text{Nid}$ 
taint   $qIO := \text{Tnt} \mid \text{Nt}$ 
access  $qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{Wtn} \mid \text{NRD} \mid \text{mayFstRD}$ 
         $\mid \text{MTntWt} \mid \text{mayTntWt}$ 

```



CK – checkpointed

NRD – not read yet

Qualifiers for inputs and (non-)idempotence

```
start_atom(nlds: rb, ckpts: bin)
  rb++
  let temp = IN() in
    water_crop
    if temp > 40
```

bin: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{CK}), \text{Nt} \rangle$, log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{NRD}), \text{Nt} \rangle$

```

       $q := \langle qId, qIO \rangle$ 
idem.   $qId := \text{Id} \mid \text{Id}(qAcc) \mid \text{Nid}$ 
taint   $qIO := \text{Tnt} \mid \text{Nt}$ 
access  $qAcc := \text{CK} \mid \text{Wtn} \mid \text{NRD} \mid \text{mayFstRD}$ 
         $\mid \text{MTntWt} \mid \text{mayTntWt}$ 
```

log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{MTntWt}), \text{Tnt} \rangle$

```
log := temp/2
```

```
bin := temp
```

```
log := temp
log := (log - 32) * 5/9
end_atom
```

CK – checkpointed

NRD – not read yet

MTntWt – written on all paths (in Tnt context)

Qualifiers for inputs and (non-)idempotence

```
start_atom(nlds: rb, ckpts: bin)
  rb++
  let temp = IN() in
    water_crop
    if temp > 40
```

bin: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{CK}), \text{Nt} \rangle$, log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{NRD}), \text{Nt} \rangle$

```
q := ⟨qId, qIO⟩
idem.  qId := Id | Id(qAcc) | Nid
taint  qIO := Tnt | Nt
access qAcc := CK | Wtn | NRD | mayFstRD
        | MTntWt | mayTntWt
```

log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{MTntWt}), \text{Tnt} \rangle$

```
log := temp/2
```

```
bin := temp
```

log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{mayTntWt}), \text{Tnt} \rangle$

unstable value!

```
log := temp
log := (log - 32) * 5/9
end_atom
```

CK – checkpointed

NRD – not read yet

MTntWt – written on all paths (in Tnt context)

mayTntWt – written on one tainted path, but not on all

Qualifiers for inputs and (non-)idempotence

```
start_atom(nlds: rb, ckpts: bin)
  rb++
  let temp = IN() in
    water_crop
    if temp > 40
```

bin: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{CK}), \text{Nt} \rangle$, log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{NRD}), \text{Nt} \rangle$

```
q := ⟨qId, qIO⟩
idem.  qId := Id | Id(qAcc) | Nid
taint  qIO := Tnt | Nt
access qAcc := CK | Wtn | NRD | mayFstRD
          | MTntWt | mayTntWt
```

log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{MTntWt}), \text{Tnt} \rangle$

log := temp/2

bin := temp

log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{mayTntWt}), \text{Tnt} \rangle$

log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{Wtn}), \text{Tnt} \rangle$

```
log := temp
log := (log - 32) * 5/9
end_atom
```

CK — checkpointed

NRD — not read yet

MTntWt — written on all paths (in Tnt context)

mayTntWt — written on one tainted path, but not on all

Wtn — written on all paths (in Nt context)

Qualifiers for inputs and (non-)idempotence

```
start_atom(nlds: rb, ckpts: bin)
  rb++
  let temp = IN() in
    water_crop
    if temp > 40
```

bin: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{CK}), \text{Nt} \rangle$, log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{NRD}), \text{Nt} \rangle$

```
q := ⟨qId, qIO⟩
idem.  qId := Id | Id(qAcc) | Nid
taint  qIO := Tnt | Nt
access qAcc := CK | Wtn | NRD | mayFstRD
        | MTntWt | mayTntWt
```

log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{MTntWt}), \text{Tnt} \rangle$

log := temp/2

bin := temp

log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{mayTntWt}), \text{Tnt} \rangle$

log: $\langle \text{Id}(\text{Wtn}), \text{Tnt} \rangle$

```
log := temp
log := (log - 32) * 5/9
end_atom
```



CK – checkpointed

NRD – not read yet

MTntWt – written on all paths (in Tnt context)


mayTntWt – written on one tainted path, but not on all

Wtn – written on all paths (in Nt context)

no remaining mayTntWt variables!

Metatheory

- progress and preservation
 - like undo-logging but accounting for new access qualifiers and post-contexts
- fundamental theorem and adequacy (future work!)
 - reasoning about output orderings and nonidempotence



Conclusion and Future Work

Summary

- Modal crash types for intermittent computing [Derakhshan et al., ESOP '23]
[Dotzel et al., TOPLAS '25]
- Undo-logging
- I/O, flexible branching, nonidempotence
- Intermittent shared memory concurrency

Summary

- **Modal crash types for intermittent computing** [Derakhshan et al., ESOP '23]
[Dotzel et al., TOPLAS '25]
- Undo-logging
- I/O, flexible branching, nonidempotence
- Intermittent shared memory concurrency

$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee \downarrow \left(\boxed{\text{Failure}} \rightsquigarrow \uparrow \overset{\text{stable NV}}{C} \right)$$

Success Failure

“Every intermittent execution of a correct program has a corresponding continuously-powered execution of it.”

(via a **logical relation**)

Summary

- Modal crash types for intermittent computing [Derakhshan et al., ESOP '23]
[Dotzel et al., TOPLAS '25]
- **Undo-logging**
- I/O, flexible branching, nonidempotence
- Intermittent shared memory concurrency

$$C = \downarrow \uparrow \text{unit} \vee (\boxed{\text{NV}} \rightsquigarrow \downarrow \uparrow C)$$

Success Failure

unstable NV

“Every intermittent execution of a correct program has a corresponding continuously-powered execution of it.”



(via a **logical relation**)

Summary

- Modal crash types for intermittent computing [Derakhshan et al., ESOP '23]
[Dotzel et al., TOPLAS '25]
- Undo-logging
- **I/O, flexible branching, nonidempotence**
- Intermittent shared memory concurrency



**delay failing until the
end of an atomic region**



**idempotent outputs are
not repeated**

*“Every intermittent
execution of a correct
program has a
corresponding
continuously-powered
execution of it.”*

(via a **logical relation**)

Summary

- Modal crash types for intermittent computing [Derakhshan et al., ESOP '23]
[Dotzel et al., TOPLAS '25]
- Undo-logging
- I/O, flexible branching, nonidempotence
- **Intermittent shared memory concurrency**


The **first** provably correct supports for intermittent concurrency.

*“Every intermittent execution of a correct **concurrent** program has a corresponding continuously-powered execution of it.”*


(via an **equivalence relation**)

processes that do not successfully finish executing should not affect idempotent results!

Future Work



shared memory
concurrency in crash types




distributed intermittent
systems




fault-resilient cyberphysical
systems

Future Work



**shared memory
concurrency in crash types**




distributed intermittent
systems




fault-resilient cyberphysical
systems

Future Work



shared memory
concurrency in crash types



**distributed intermittent
systems**




fault-resilient cyberphysical
systems

Future Work



shared memory
concurrency in crash types



distributed intermittent
systems



**fault-resilient cyberphysical
systems**

Logical Foundations of Intermittent Computing

Myra Dotzel

PhD Thesis Defense